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The a r t i c l e  a t t e m p t s  t o  p r e s e n t  a  s o c i a l  
a n a l y s i s  o f  C a n a d i a n  l i b e l  l a w .  I t  a r -  
g u e s  t h a t  t h e  l a w  i s  e x p r e s s l y  b i a s e d  
a g a i n s t  p o o r  a n d  w o r k i n g - c l a s s  p l a i n -  
t i f f s .  T h i s  i s  a n o m a l o u s  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  
c e n t r a l  i d e o l o g i c a l  p o s t u l a t e  o f  b o u r -  
g e o i s  l e g a l  s y s t e m s  -- e q u a l i t y  b e f o r e  
t h e  l a w .  
L ' a r t i c l e  cherche B prCsenter une analyse 
soc ia le  de l a  l o i  canadienne aur l a  
diffamation. I1 dCmontre que l a  l o i  e s t  
f ormellement prCd isposCe contre  lea  
p la ignants  appartenant aux c l a s s e s  
laborieuses e t  indigentes.  Ceci e s t  une 
anomalie Ctant donn6e 1' idgologie 
cen t ra le  d 'Cgali tC devant l a  l o i  postulCe 
par l e s  syst&mes lCgaux bourgeois. 
Introduction 
The law of libel contains a number of provi- 
sions, both substantive and procedural , which 
limit the ability of poor and working-class plain- 
tiffs to obtain redress for injury to reputation. 
In what follows21 will set out these provisions 
using the Ontario law as an illustration, and 
venture some analysis of them. My aim in doing so 
is not to expound legal doctrine in the fashion of 
the traditional article. Indeed, I assume a basic 
familiarity with libel law on the p a r t  of the 
reader. The purpose rather is t o  take note of 
certain well - established principles and prac- 
tices and then at tempt  t o  order them from a social 
perspective. My premise, t o  adopt  the words of a 
research study prepared for the Royal Commission 
on Newspapers (Kent Commission), is  t h a t  libel law 
"...is not very accessible t o  the average l i t i -  
gant" (Wright, 1981 , 49). 
Legal Representat ion 
The Legal Aid Act (R.S.O. 1980, c.234) i s  an 
appropriate starting point. The Act provides in 
section 15 t h a t :  
A certificate shall not be issued t o  a person, 
( a )  in proceedings wholly or partly in res- 
pect of defamation or loss of service of 
a female in consequence of rape; 
The effect of the section i s  t h a t  legal aid i s  
expressIy denied in two sorts of civil proceeding. 
Prior t o  the 1980 revision of the Statutes of 
Ontario, three additional actions -- breach of 
promise of marriage, alienation of affections, and 
criminal conversation -- were mentioned in s.15 
(R.S.O. 1970, c.239, s.15). The words "or seduc- 
tion" also appeared after the word "rape". I t  is  
not clear why these five actions had been ex- 
cluded, nor why defamation was lumped together 
with the others. 
On the f i r s t  point, the exclusion appeared 
initially in the voluntary legal aid scheme which 
the Law Society of Upper Canada established in 
1951 (Joint Committee on Legal Aid, 1965). The 
Joint Committee on Legal Aid noted the exclusion 
in its 1965 Report, but recommended that it be 
retained ( 1  1 1  ). The Report gave no reason for 
this recommendation. It was simply stated that 
"no representations at any time were made to the 
Committee that there should be any change in these 
exclusions under any extended legal aid plan" 
(Joint Committee, 1965, 59). No question was 
raised about the matter in the Ontario Legislature 
when the Bill arising from the Report was debated 
(Legislative Assembly, 1966, 5201). 
Concerning the other point one can only spe- 
culate. It might have been thought that the four 
other actions were archaic or obsolete, or that 
they tended in practice to be frivolous and vexa- 
tious. The fact that the three actions which no 
longer appear in s. 15 were statutorily abol ished 
in 1977 and 1978 tends to support these views? I 
find it difficult, however, to see how either view 
could plausibly be advanced with respect to defa- 
mat ion proceedings. Whatever may have been the 
reasons for it, the provision quoted above first 
became law in 1966 (R.S.O. 1966, c.80, s.15). 
Slightly more than a quarter of all legal aid 
expenditures in Ontario go towards fees and dis- 
bursements in civil actions (Law Society, 1981, 38 
- 40). The most expensive category is divorce or 
other domestic matters, which in 1980-81 accounted 
for $ 9,185,678 out of $ 11,284,765 spent on civil 
actions. Given that a relatively small part of 
the legal aid budget goes for non-domestic matters 
anyway, it seems difficult on strictly financial 
grounds to justify the exclusion of defamation 
proceedings. 
Since legal aid is denied, a potential plain- 
tiff will have to finance the action out of his or 
her own pocket . Li be1 act ions are expensive . 
Further, a plaintiff will have difficulty finding 
a lawyer who knows much about libel. Libel is 
usually not dealt with in Torts courses offered in 
Ontario Law schools (Wright, 1981, 49 - 50) and 
does not receive specific treatment in the Bar 
Admission Course. A lawyer in a small general 
practice will seldom handle a libel action. A 
plaintiff will have to seek counsel from among 
those practitioners who specialize in libel ac- 
tion. Such practitioners are usually found in 
large firms. Their time is ~aluable.~Of course, 
if the defendant is a newspaper in a chain or a 
network television station, it will be able to 
call on the services of a skilled and experienced 
libel lawyer. In addition, libel actions are 
normally tried by a jury. This tends to make 
libel actions even more costly. 
Retract ion and Apology 
The ability which the law gives to defendants 
to mitigate damages by retraction or apology can 
place severe pressure on an impecunious plaintiff. 
Common law recognised that an apology could oper- 
ate to mitigate the defendant's damages. The 
Libel and Slander Act (R.S.O. 1980, c.37) has 
retained this principle, but has both clarified 
and expanded it. A written apology, tendered at 
an early opportunity, may be pleaded in mitigation 
by defendants generally (s.22). Where the defen- 
dant is a newspaper or broadcaster, and the libel 
was originally pub1 ished without ma1 ice or gross 
negligence, an apology made at the earliest oppor- 
tunity will have a like effect (s.9). Section 5 
of the Libel and Slander Act is significant. If 
the defendant is a newspaper or broadcaster and 
makes a "full and fair" retraction within three 
days of the plaintiff giving notice that he or she 
believes himself or herself to have been libelled, 
the amount recoverable in subsequent proceedings 
is reduced to 'actual damages". 
Now the law is in fact somewhat more compli- 
cated than this brief recitation would suggest. 
Thus, there must be a real apology or retraction 
and not simply a repmcation of the libel 
(Brannigan v. S.I.U., 1964; Platt v. Time, 1964). 
There are also certain differences in effect be- 
tween an apology and a retraction. For example, 
justification may be pleaded as a defense where 
there has been a retraction (New Era v. Toronto 
Star (1963), but not in conjunction with an apol- 
ogy (Williams, 1976, 108). The general result of 
an apology or retraction, however, is that the 
plaintiff will be unlikely to collect more than 
"actual " or "spec i a1 " damages -- direct pecuniary 
loss attributable to the libel. The award of 
damages for injury to reputation is largely pre- 
cluded. The plaintiff does have the satisfaction, 
for what it may be worth, of an apology. He or 
she will have to be very determined, or very rich, 
to continue to seek the added solace of a judgment 
by a court. 
Payment Into Court 
If the defendant has retracted or apologized 
and the plaintiff still persists, then the coup de 
grace, a payment into court, may be administered. 
This step should be sufficient to dissuade any but 
the wealthiest or most foolhardy of plaintiffs. 
The effect of payment in is we1 1 known. If the 
plaintiff refuses to accept the money paid into 
court and persists in pursuing his or her claim, 
she or he will be penalized by having to pay the 
costs of the action incurred subsequent to the 
date of the payment in, unless the amount of money 
which is eventually awarded as damages exceeds the 
amount of the payment in. This device is general- 
ly available to defendants in civil actions (Rules 
of Practice, 1980, Reg. 540, Rule 306), but there 
are special provisions applicable only to libel 
actions. First, in the case of a newspaper or a 
broadcaster, the libel must have been pub1 ished i n  
good faith or without malice or gross negligence (Libel and Slander Act, s .I I ). Secondly, and more 
important, the fact t h a t  payment into court has 
been made may be brought t o  the attention of the judge or jury (Ontario Rule 317) .  The screws on 
the plaintiff are tightened another turn. 
Security for Costs 
The defendant in a libel action may ask t h a t  
the plaintiff give security for costs (Libel and 
Slander Act, ss . l3, 20. Also Ontario Rule 373) .  
To o b t a i n  an order t o  this effect the defendant 
must show by affidavit: 
the nature of the action and of the 
defence ; 
t h a t  the plaintiff i s  not possessed of 
property sufficient to answer the costs 
of the action i n  case judgment i s  given 
i n  favour of the defendant; 
and 
either ( i )  t h a t  the defendant has a good 
defence on the merits, or ( i i  ) t h a t  the 
grounds of action are tr ivial  or vexa- 
t ious .4 
the plaintiff is  unable to  comply with 
such an order, the proceedings are t o  be stayed 
until the required security i s  given. There are, 
however, cases where an impecunious plaintiff w i t h  
a bona f ide cause of action has, a t  the discretion 
of the court, been required t o  post only a nominal 
sum as security of costs. This discretion has 
been exercised when the circumstances are such 
t h a t  to order the plaintiff to give f u l l  security 
for costs would deprive him or her of a cause of 
act ion .5 
Measure of Damages 
Assuming that a plaintiff actually manages to 
have his or her libel action proceed to trial, he 
or she wi 11 discover that, when it comes to injury 
to reputation, some people are more equal than 
others. I do not propose here to discuss the 
general difficulties involved in quantifying, in 
an amount of money, injury to reputation; nor 
shall I consider the entire range of factors, in 
particular the conduct of the defendant, which are 
supposed to be considered in determining the 
amount to be awarded. I am concerned only with 
the way in which, and the extent to which, the 
social and economic status of the plaintiff will 
enter into the computation of damages. 
In the first place, libel actions are usually 
tried by a jury (Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1980, 
c.223, s.57). Juries ordinarily give general 
verdicts and they never give reasons. The award 
of a particular sum of money is simply announced. 
Accepting this, it seems to me inconceivable that 
a jury would not be influenced by the various 
indicia of class -- dress, speech, mannerisms -- 
which the plaintiff exhibits. This speculative 
view is fortified by the statements of judges and 
commentators who assert that social status is 
definitely among the factors to be weighed when 
arriving at an assessment of damages. 
The general approach has been expressed by 
Professor Jeremy Williams: "...the position of 
the plaintiff or his occupation may well affect 
the award of damages" (1976, 140). The cases use 
similar language, referring to such matters as 
''...the position of the parties in society and 
their standing in the community1' (Stopforth v. 
Goyer, 1978) ,  t h e  "pos i t ion  and s tanding"  of t h e  
p l a i n t i f f  ( P a l e t t a  v. Lethbridge Herald,  1978; 
Baxter v. C.B.C., 1980; See a l s o  McKewen and 
Lewis, 1974, 177 - 178) ,  "...the ac tua l  s tanding  
and r epu ta t i on  of t h e  p l a i n t i f f s  in t h e  community" 
(Neeld v. Western Broadcasting Co. Ltd . , 1976 ; 
Vogel v .  C.B.C., 1982).  The j u s t i f i c a t i o n  advan- 
ced f o r  t h i s  view runs roughly a s  fo l lows .  The 
h igher  t h e  p l a i n t i f f ' s  pos i t i on  o r  s t and ing  i n  
s o c i e t y ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  r epu ta t i on  t h e  p l a i n t i f f  
w i l l  have. The g r e a t e r  t h e  r e p u t a t i o n ,  t h e  more 
s e r i o u s  t h e  in j u ry  caused t o  i t  be a 1 i be l  . And 
i t  must be t h e  ca se  t h a t  t h e  more s e r i o u s  t h e  
i n j u r y ,  t h e  l a r g e r  t h e  amount awarded a s  damages 
(Neeld v. Western Broadcasting Co. Ltd., 1976).  
For example, Chief Just i ce  Deschenes of t h e  Quebec 
Super ior  Court s t a t e d  t h e  fo l lowing  i n  1978 con- 
cerning t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  t o  be observed in a s se s s ing  
damages where t h e  p l a i n t i f f  was a p o l i t i c i a n .  
I f  s o c i e t y  wants ,  a s  i t  should ,  t h a t  i t s  
b e s t  c i t i z e n s  t u r n  t o  pub l i c  a f f a i r s ,  i t  
must show t h e  high esteem in which i t  
holds  them; and those  who would impru- 
d e n t l y  r i s k ,  by a s t r o k e  of t h e  pen, t o  
des t roy  t h e  r epu ta t i on  of such dedica ted  
men ought t o  be prepared t o  pay t h e  high 
p r i c e  t h a t  such a misdeed deserves  
(Snyder v. Montreal Gaze t te ,  1978). 
The dec i s ion  of t h e  Nova Sco t i a  Court of ADDeal in  
, r ,  -~ 
B a r l t r o p  v. C.B.C. ( s ee  a l s o  Tataryn,  1981) i s  
a l s o l u x r a t i v e .  B r i e f l y ,  Dr. B a r l t r o ~ .  an 
English phys ic ian ,  had appeared a s  an e x p e A  -wi t -  
ness f o r  two r e f i n i n g  companies a t  a pub l i c  hear -  
ing i n t o  a l l e g a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  companies were caus-  
ing lead  p o l l u t i o n .  Ba r l t rop  rece ived  $ 1,000 a 
day and expenses from t h e s e  companies while  ap- 
pear ing .  In a subsequent documentary on t h e  r a d i o  
programme "As I t  Happens", t h e  C.B.C. b roadcas t  
the fo l lowing  s ta tement  by an American patholo-  
g i s t :  
Dr. Barltrop is a paid consultant to the 
lead industry. He is paid to say what he 
has just said. 
The Court of Appeal held that this statement, and, 
indeed, the programme as a whole, was libellous 
and proceeded to assess damages against the C.B.C. 
While the court accepted that Barltrop had not 
proven the loss of any consulting business as a 
result of being libel led, it nonetheless awarded 
substantial damages, The major factor the court 
considered in arriving at this conclusion was Dr. 
Barltrop 's llprofessional eminence". 
The moral seems clear. A person who is 
socially significant is deemed to have a good 
reputation and one who libels another will pay 
heavily. An ordinary person cannot have much of a 
reputation and will be unlikely to collect much in 
the way of damages from someone who 1 ibels him or 
her .' 
Conclusion 
Let me briefly recapitulate. If a poor or 
working-class person gets libel led and wants to 
sue, something roughly like this will happen. He 
or she will be denied legal aid and will retain a 
lawyer who is neither knowledgeable nor exper- 
ienced in libel matters. Conversely, if the de- 
fendant is a large newspaper or a broadcaster, it 
will very 1 ikely have available the services of an 
experienced libel lawyer. After the libel notice 
is issued, the defendant may retract. At this 
point the plaintiff's lawyer will likely advise 
acceptance of the retraction. If the plaintiff is 
determined to proceed despite this advice, the 
defendant may make a payment into court. If that 
is  not sufficient, the defendant might ask t h a t  
the plaintiff be ordered to give security for 
costs. Assume t h a t  the plaintiff i s  undetered, 
presses on and receives judgment against the de- 
fendant. He or she will then discover t h a t ,  con- 
trary to whatever one may t h i n k  about oneself, he 
or she has no reputation to speak of. He or she 
wi 11 be awarded a token sum as damages. This sum 
will be less t h a n  the amount paid into court and 
the plaintiff will be presented with an enormous 
bill for costs. Indeed, t h a t  may not be the end 
of the matter. The defendant may decide t o  ap- 
peal . The appel 1 ate court judges may not  give the 
plaintiff even the courtesy which he or she 
received from the jury.  If t h a t  which seemed 
reasonable to the jury does not appear i n  the same 
light to a bench of appellate judges they may set 
aside the t r ia l  court's judgment (See for example, 
the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in McLough- 
lin v. Kutasy, 1979). 
Now i t  may well be objected t h a t  the fore- 
going is somewhat fanciful since poor or working- 
class people do not, in the existing scheme of 
things, get libelled very often. This, up t o  a 
point, is true. The media prefer to comment on 
the doings of the rich, the famous, and the power- 
ful .  But i t  is not the case t h a t  poor or working- 
class people are never libelledw7 
When this happens, the law is expressly 
biased against the plaintiff. This is anomalous. 
The central ideological feature of bourgeois lega 1 
systems is t h a t ,  formally at  least, they treat a1 1 
people as equals. The law may affect people un-  
equally, b u t  each person confronts the legal sys- 
tem as the notional equal of a l l  others. B u t  not 
in the law of libelma 
FOOTNOTES 
yy his article was prepared with the aid of 
funds made available by the htario Law Founda- 
tion. I wish to thank Michael Rumball for his 
most valuable assistance and Robert Solomon, 
Mor ley Gors ky , and E. L. Donegan for their com- 
ments on an earlier draft. The opinions expressed 
are entirely my own. 
2 The law in the other common law provinces is 
similar. 
3 Breach of promise of marriage was abolished 
by the Marriage Act, S.O. 1977, c.42, s.32, now 
R.S.O. 1980, c.256, s.32. The other actions fell 
victim to the Family Law Reform Act, S.O. 1978, 
c.2, ss. 65-72. See now R.S.O. 1980, c.152, ss. 
65 - 72. 
4 Gunn v, North York Public Library Board 
( 1 977 ) 2%~ .c 6 8 . h m e m  m e -  
v. Creed Furs Limited (1972) 3 O.R. 827 and -& 
f l i e a 7 5 T - 6 f  theibel-and Slander Act the 
same construction which had earlier been placed on 
s.13 of the Act, which is in essentially similar 
terms. Oshanek v. Toronto Daily Star (1966) 1 
O.R. 492- a E o , N i k o l i K  Northern - Life 
Publishing Company ( 1 9 7 6 m . c  335. 
5 Sonntag v. Krause (1976) 11 O.R. (2d) 500. 
See al'ZTh%nm i u k t r y k  (1933) 1 W.W.R. 648. 
Colin Wrig-87 s ~ r e c o m m e n d s  that secur- 
ity for costs be abolished in libel actions (p. 
50). 
6 It must be admitted that there is no case 
which explicitly states this much. However, it is 
my opinion that this is an inference which can 
leg i t imate ly  be drawn from t h e  case law. See 
a l s o ,  Robertson (1976). Although not d i r e c t l y  on 
po in t ,  Leonard v .  Sun Publishing Co. Ltd. (1956) 4 
D.L.R. -(2d) makes t h e  p o i n t t h a t  a small 
reputat ion means a small award. 
7 One could make out a case t h a t  a g r e a t  deal 
of j o u r n a l i s t i c  commentary about the labour move- 
ment is 1 ibe l  lous of union members general ly.  See 
Cosbey (1978), S o l i d a r i t y  (1980). See a l s o  
Whitaker et.  a l .  v. Huntington (1981) 15 C.C.L.T. 
19, w h e r e a n  was successful ly  sued by a local  
union pres ident  a f t e r  having publ ic ly  asser ted  
t h a t  t he  union was undemocratic. 
8 A general except ion of t o  my argument should 
be made in the  case of Senator Lawson of British 
Columbia, an o f f i c i a l  o f  t h e  Teamsters' Union. He 
was a successful  p l a i n t i f f  i n  t h ree  reported defa- 
mation cases:  Lawson v .  Thompson (1969) 5 D.L.R. 
(3d)  550; Lawson v. ~ h d b m 4 )  48 D.L.R. (3d)  
556; Lawson v.Burns719'-6' D.L.R. (3) 240. See 
a l s o m n m .  - S.I.U. (1964) 42 D.L.R. (2d) 
249. 
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